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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
Ocsulis Dorsainvil has filed a motion pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2244(b)(3)(A), as amended by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, seeking 
certification to file a second § 2255 motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct his sentence. After Dorsainvil'sfirst 
petition was denied on the merits, the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501 
(1995). Dorsainvil argues that Bailey renders his weapons 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) invalid and asks that 
this court certify his second petition so that he may 





FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Following a jury trial, Ocsulis Dorsainvil was convicted in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 
distribution of cocaine base, and use of a firearm during 
and in relation to drug trafficking, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 924(c)(1). In the course of the trial the government 
introduced evidence that Dorsainvil and his co-defendant, 
Anel Louis, had arranged to sell some crack cocaine to an 
undercover policeman. When the police arrived, Dorsainvil 
was in the driver's seat of a pickup truck from which the 
drugs were to be sold. There was a gun in an open paper 
bag next to the driver's seat, in the center of the pickup 
truck. It was purchased by and registered to Dorsainvil. 
There was testimony from police officers that, as the officers 
moved in for the arrest after the buyer left to get the funds 
to complete the drug sale, Dorsainvil was fumbling with his 
pants, where cocaine was found, and making movements 
as if he were reaching for something in front of him. 
Dorsainvil did not touch the gun, and was arrested without 
incident. His wallet and personal papers were found in the 
bag with the gun after his arrest. He testified at trial and 
admitted that he possessed the gun, but he denied that the 
gun was related in any way to the drug transaction, stating 
that he bought it for protection while living in Florida. The 
jury convicted him on all counts. 
 
Dorsainvil did not file a direct appeal, but sought 
collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and double jeopardy. His 
pro se petition was denied on the merits by orders dated 
November 30, 1993, March 2, 1994, and April 22, 1994, 
and there was no appeal. On December 6, 1995, the 
Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 
501 (1995), construing § 924(c)(1). Approximately nine 
months later, Dorsainvil filed a second pro se § 2255 
petition in the district court. The district court ruled that it 
did not have jurisdiction to address the petition because of 
changes effected in § 2255 procedure by the recently 
enacted Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (the "AEDPA") 
(codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2255), and that only 
this court could give the necessary certificate. Dorsainvil 
then filed a motion with this court for certification of his 
second petition for relief under § 2255. We denied his 
motion, but stayed our order, appointed Dorsainvil counsel, 
and invited counsel to brief a series of questions concerning 
the AEDPA's newly enacted gatekeeping provisions. 
 







Under the AEDPA, before a successive § 2255 motion 
may be considered by the district court, it must be certified 
by a three judge panel of the court of appeals to contain: 
 
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and 
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
movant guilty of the offense; or 
 
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive 
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
 
Dorsainvil had been convicted, inter alia, for using and 
carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The 
language of that section, which imposes punishment upon 
a person who "during and in relation to any . . . drug 
trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm," was 
construed in Bailey, where the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant could not be convicted of using a firearm under 
that statute unless the government proved that the 
defendant "actively employed the firearm during and in 
relation to the predicate crime." 116 S. Ct. at 509. 
Dorsainvil claims that there was insufficient evidence to 
show that he actively employed a firearm in relation to a 
drug trafficking crime and that he is therefore imprisoned 
for conduct that the Supreme Court has determined is not 
illegal. 
 
In the posture of the matter before us, our task is not to 
determine if, in fact, Dorsainvil used a firearm in a manner 
that satisfied the Supreme Court's Bailey interpretation but 
whether the AEDPA precludes a court from reaching the 
merits. Because this is Dorsainvil's second § 2255 petition, 
we may grant Dorsainvil's motion for a certificate only if 
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Dorsainvil meets one of the two prongs of § 2255's 
gatekeeping provision. Dorsainvil argues that he satisfies 
both prongs.1 We consider his contentions in turn. 
 
Dorsainvil argues that his application contains the 
requisite "newly discovered evidence." This contention is 
plainly incorrect. Dorsainvil has not presented any "newly 
discovered" facts that would bear on his guilt. Instead he 
argues that the Bailey decision places established facts in 
a different light so that they are as consistent with 
innocence as they are with guilt. 
 
We reject this creative interpretation of the plain 
language of § 2255(1). If, after the Bailey decision, the 
established facts would not have been sufficient to permit 
a reasonable fact finder to find that Dorsainvil was guilty of 
the use of a gun as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), it is 
only because Bailey changed the interpretation of "use" of 
a firearm by operation of law, not because of "newly 
discovered evidence." We view the first prong of the 
amended § 2255 as directed to certification of a successive 
petition based on a change in the underlying factual 
scenario, and conclude that Dorsainvil has alleged no such 
change. 
 
It is the second and alternative prong of the amended 
§ 2255 that is directed to certification based on a change in 
the legal scenario. Dorsainvil contends that Bailey 
established a "new rule of constitutional law." Five courts of 
appeals have already determined that Bailey did not 
establish a new rule of constitutional law, but simply 
interpreted a substantive criminal statute. See In re Vial,___ 
F.3d ___, 1997 WL 324385, at *3 (4th Cir. June 16, 1997); 
Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 
1997)(per curiam); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278, 
279 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 
(11th Cir. 1996)(per curiam); Nunez v. United States, 96 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Dorsainvil does not argue that the Act is inapplicable because it 
cannot be applied retroactively to second motions made after its effective 
date if the first motion was made before, see In re Vial, 1997 WL 324385, 
at *6-*7 (4th Cir. June 16, 1997) (Hall, J., dissenting), and hence we 
have no occasion to discuss the Supreme Court's opinion in Lindh v. 
Murphy, 1997 WL 338568, at *3 (U.S. June 23, 1997). 
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F.3d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1996). Dorsainvil counters that 
where a successive petitioner claims that s/he has been 
convicted and punished for conduct that the law no longer 
makes criminal, the Due Process Clause is implicated, 
because "[i]ncarceration for acts that do not constitute a 
crime is patently offensive to the Constitution." Appellant's 
Brief at 16. Dorsainvil appears to conclude that therefore 
Bailey embodies an implicit rule of constitutional law. 
 
Dorsainvil points to no legislative history to support such 
a reading, which would be contrary to the plain language of 
the statute. Under the statute, it is the "new rule" itself that 
must be one "of constitutional law," not the effect of failing 
to apply that rule to successive petitioners. Because we 
believe it is plain that Bailey is not a "new rule of 
constitutional law," we need not dwell on the fact that when 
the Supreme Court announced its interpretation of 
§ 924(c)(1), it did not make it "retroactive to cases on 
collateral review." See Lorentsen, 106 F.3d at 279; Nunez, 
96 F.3d at 992. The facts that the government has 
conceded that Bailey should be applied retroactively, see 
Appellee's Brief at 20, and courts have applied it 
retroactively on collateral review, see, e.g., United States v. 
Barnhardt, 93 F.3d 706, 709 (10th Cir. 1996), are 
consistent with viewing Bailey as a substantive statutory 
holding. Were it a constitutional rule, it would be subject to 
the presumption against the retroactive application of new 
rules of constitutional law as set forth in Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Barnhardt, 93 F.3d at 709. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that Dorsainvil has failed to 




Dorsainvil argues that if his claim that he has been 
convicted and imprisoned for conduct that is not criminal 
cannot be heard by the district court, then § 2255 as 
amended by the AEDPA is unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Suspension Clause of Article I, section 9 of the 
Constitution. Were no other avenue of judicial review 
available for a party who claims that s/he is factually or 
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legally innocent as a result of a previously unavailable 
statutory interpretation, we would be faced with a thorny 
constitutional issue. Dorsainvil argues, however, that there 
are a number of other avenues for relief, and proffers in 
addition to the writ of habeas corpus available under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, the writ of error coram nobis, the writ of 
audita querela and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We need not consider the litany of potential 
alternatives, because we conclude that, under narrow 
circumstances, a petitioner in Dorsainvil's uncommon 
situation may resort to the writ of habeas corpus codified 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
 
Section 2241 states that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be 
granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the 
district court and any circuit judge within their respective 
jurisdictions" to prisoners "in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(a),(c)(3). In Felker v. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333 
(1996), a case involving a state prisoner, the Supreme 
Court considered the extent to which the AEDPA 
circumscribed its own power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus. The Court held that although section 106(b)(3)(E) of 
the AEDPA, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), precludes 
the Supreme Court from reviewing by appeal or petition for 
certiorari a judgment on an application for leave to file a 
second habeas petition in district court, the Act does not 
affect the Supreme Court's authority to hear habeas 
petitions filed as original matters in that Court. Id. at 2339. 
Reviewing the history of the predecessors of § 2241, the 
Court observed that in the 1996 Act Congress had not 
expressly referred to the Court's longstanding authority to 
entertain a petition for habeas corpus, and stated that 
"[r]epeals by implication are not favored." Id. at 2338. Thus, 
in Felker, as in its decision more than a century earlier in 
Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1869), the Court 
specifically "declin[ed] to find a . . . repeal of § 2241 of Title 
28 . . . by implication." Felker, 116 S.Ct. at 2339.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that in a recent decision, a district court held that the AEDPA 
provision barring judicial review of certain deportation orders did not 
repeal the habeas corpus jurisdiction that it has pursuant to § 2241, and 
in so holding it relied upon the same language quoted in the text. See 
Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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Ever since 1948, when Congress enacted § 2255 to allow 
for collateral review of the sentences of federal prisoners in 
the trial court, that section, rather than § 2241, has been 
the usual avenue for federal prisoners seeking to challenge 
the legality of their confinement. The addition of § 2255 was 
deemed necessary because the judiciary was experiencing 
practical problems in light of the obligation for federal 
prisoners to file their § 2241 claims in the district where 
they were confined. This requirement meant that "the few 
District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major 
federal penal institutions are located were required to 
handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions far 
from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses and 
the records of the sentencing court solely because of the 
fortuitous concentration of federal prisoners within the 
district." United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213-14 
(1952). 
 
With the enactment of § 2255, much of the collateral 
attack by federal prisoners has been routed to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court. Congress's interest in 
cabining those claims lays behind its enactment of Title I of 
the AEDPA. Significantly, however, the AEDPA did not 
amend the "safety-valve" clause in § 2255 that refers to the 
power of the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus 
pursuant to § 2241. 
 
Indeed, § 2255, even following the recent amendment by 
the AEDPA, specifically allows recourse to original writs of 
habeas corpus, albeit in narrowly defined circumstances: 
 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of 
a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by 
motion pursuant to this section, shall not be 
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to 
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which 
sentenced him, or that such court has denied him 
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion 
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
detention. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (emphasis added). 
 
In Hayman, decided shortly after the enactment of 
§ 2255, the Court considered the effect of the new provision 
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on habeas corpus claims brought under § 2241. 342 U.S. at 
206. Hayman, the petitioner, had filed a motion under 
§ 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
district court, after a hearing without notice to or the 
presence of Hayman, denied the motion. The court of 
appeals, questioning the adequacy and constitutionality of 
§ 2255, directed that the motion be dismissed so that 
Hayman could proceed by a writ of habeas corpus under 
§ 2241. In overturning that decision, the Supreme Court 
noted that because the district court ruling on a § 2255 
motion could compel the production of the prisoner 
confined in another district, § 2255 was neither "inadequate 
nor ineffective." Id. at 222-23. At the same time, it 
confirmed the continued availability of the writ of habeas 
corpus, stating that "in a case where the Section 2255 
procedure is shown to be `inadequate or ineffective,' the 
Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy shall 
remain open to afford the necessary hearing." Id. at 223. 
The Court concluded that "[u]nder such circumstances, [it 
need not] reach constitutional questions." Id. 
 
The "inadequate or ineffective" language as a safety-valve 
was also emphasized by the Court in Swain v. Pressley, 
430 U.S. 372 (1977), where the petitioner challenged the 
constitutionality of a provision of the District of Columbia 
Code that channeled prisoners' collateral attacks to the 
local Superior Court. The Supreme Court, relying on 
Hayman, rejected the contention that the substitution 
constituted a suspension of the Great Writ, stating: "The 
Court implicitly held in Hayman, as we hold in this case, 
that the substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither 
inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's 
detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus." Id. at 381. 
 
The government argues that a § 2255 motion is not 
"inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of Dorsainvil's 
detention because those terms should be limited to 
situations where "practical considerations precluded a 
remedy in the sentencing court." Appellee's Brief at 24 
(emphasis in original). Although it concedes that there is 
but sparse authority on the issue, it relies on legislative 
history showing that the momentum for § 2255 emanated 
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from the Judicial Conference of the United States which 
had recommended two bills, a "procedural bill" and a 
"jurisdictional bill," that were the precursors of § 2255. The 
"jurisdictional bill" would have expressly limited an 
application for writ of habeas corpus unless the prisoner 
showed that " `it appears that it has not been or will not be 
practicable to determine his rights to discharge from 
custody on [a § 2255 motion] because of his inability to be 
present at the hearing on such motion or for other 
reasons.' " Hayman, 342 U.S. at 216 n.23 (quoting 
H.R.4233 and S.1451, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (jurisdictional 
bill)). 
 
Congress did not adopt the language of the Conference's 
bill, and the statute as enacted contained the "inadequate 
or ineffective" clause without circumscribing it in the 
manner proposed in the Judicial Conference proposal. 
Nothing in § 2255 itself would limit resort to a § 2241 writ 
of habeas corpus in the manner suggested by the 
government. Although admittedly habeas corpus under 
§ 2241 is now reserved for rare cases, the Court in Hayman 
stressed that in enacting § 2255 Congress did not intend 
"to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon 
their convictions," id. at 219, but solely "to minimize the 
difficulties encountered in habeas hearings by affording the 
same right in another and more convenient forum." Id. 
 
It is noteworthy that when the Supreme Court in Swain 
turned to the issue of the adequacy of the new provision in 
the District of Columbia Code, which is virtually identical to 
§ 2255, it did not limit its consideration to "practical 
considerations," as the government argues here, but 
inquired whether the availability of a collateral remedy 
before an Article I court was adequate to test the legality of 
the detention. Swain, 430 U.S. at 382-83. Although it 
rejected the challenge, the fact that the Court considered 
the merits of the adequacy issue when the challenge went 
beyond one limited to a practicality issue suggests a 
broader scope to the "inadequate or ineffective" language 
than the government's narrow interpretation proffered here. 
Indeed, we are hard put to understand precisely the type of 
situation which the government believes fits within the 
"inadequate or ineffective" language. 
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Dorsainvil argues that the safety-valve provision of 
§ 2255 covers his situation because he seeks to challenge 
his conviction on a second § 2255 petition based on an 
intervening decision by the Supreme Court. A similar case 
"involv[ing] the availability of collateral relief from a federal 
criminal conviction based upon an intervening change in 
substantive law" came before the Supreme Court in Davis 
v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 334 (1974). In that case, the 
Court stated that a Supreme Court decision interpreting a 
criminal statute that resulted in the imprisonment of one 
whose conduct was not prohibited by law "presents 
exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy 
afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." Id. at 
346 (internal quotations omitted). The Court held that "if 
[petitioner's] contention is well taken, then [his] conviction 
and punishment are for an act that the law does not make 
criminal. There can be no room for doubt that such a 
circumstance inherently results in a complete miscarriage 
of justice and present(s) exceptional circumstances that 
justify collateral relief under § 2255." Id. at 346-47 (internal 
quotations omitted); see also United States v. Addonizio, 
442 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1979) (discussing Davis and 
observing that a refusal to have vacated his sentence 
"would surely have been a `complete miscarriage of justice,' 
since the conviction and sentence were no longer lawful"). 
 
The decision in Davis that § 2255 was broad enough to 
cover a defendant imprisoned for a crime that an 
intervening decision negates does not govern Dorsainvil's 
motion before us only because he has brought his claim for 
relief on a second § 2255 motion. In the earlier part of this 
opinion, we construed the AEDPA to preclude our 
certification of a second § 2255 motion that relied on the 
intervening decision in Bailey as a basis for certification. 
Thus, Dorsainvil does not have and, because of the 
circumstance that he was convicted for a violation of 
§ 924(c)(1) before the Bailey decision, never had an 
opportunity to challenge his conviction as inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 924(c)(1). If, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Davis, it is a "complete 
miscarriage of justice" to punish a defendant for an act that 
the law does not make criminal, thereby warranting resort 
to the collateral remedy afforded by § 2255, it must follow 
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that it is the same "complete miscarriage of justice" when 
the AEDPA amendment to § 2255 makes that collateral 
remedy unavailable. In that unusual circumstance, the 
remedy afforded by § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to 
test the legality of [Dorsainvil's] detention." 
 
There is no reason why § 2241 would not be available 
under these circumstances, provided of course that 
Dorsainvil could make the showing necessary to invoke 
habeas relief, an issue for the district court. The coverage 
of the two provisions is not dissimilar. Indeed, in Davis the 
Court stated "[t]hat history makes clear that § 2255 was 
intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in 
scope to federal habeas corpus." Davis, 417 U.S. at 343; 
see also United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d 
Cir. 1953) ("[S]ection 2255 . . . afford[s] to a convicted 
federal prisoner a remedy which is the substantial 
equivalent of the conventional writ of habeas corpus.") 
(emphasis added). 
 
We do not suggest that § 2255 would be "inadequate or 
ineffective" so as to enable a second petitioner to invoke 
§ 2241 merely because that petitioner is unable to meet the 
stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255. 
Such a holding would effectively eviscerate Congress's 
intent in amending § 2255. However, allowing someone in 
Dorsainvil's unusual position - that of a prisoner who had 
no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a 
crime that an intervening change in substantive law may 
negate, even when the government concedes that such a 
change should be applied retroactively - is hardly likely to 
undermine the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255. 
 
Nothing in our holding in this case represents a deviation 
from our prior precedent strictly construing the 
applicability of the safety-valve language in § 2255. See 
Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 
1971) (per curiam) (unfavorable legal standards prevailing in 
circuit where sentencing court located does not render 
§ 2255 remedy "inadequate or ineffective"); Litterio v. Parker, 
369 F.2d 395, 396 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (sentencing 
court's prior denial of identical claims does not render 
§ 2255 remedy "inadequate or ineffective"); Mucherino v. 
Blackwell, 340 F.2d 94, 95 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) 
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(same); Crismond v. Blackwell, 333 F.2d 374, 377 & n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1964) (neither 2,000 mile distance between sentencing 
court and district of confinement, nor denial of relief by 
sentencing court, nor denial of leave to appeal from 
sentencing court in forma pauperis, render § 2255 remedy 
"inadequate or ineffective," nor do any "unusual 
circumstances" exist); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. 
Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954) (remedy by § 2255 
motion not "inadequate or ineffective" if district court "could 
have entertained the prisoner's claim, inquired fully into 
the facts and granted the very relief the prisoner is 
seeking"); see also Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 
(10th Cir. 1996) (denial of prior § 2255 motion does not 
show that § 2255 is an inadequate remedy). 
 
The government has not suggested that Dorsainvil has 
abused the writ, the principal situation that the AEDPA 
was intended to eliminate and for which the Court in Felker 
chose to be "inform[ed]" by the gatekeeping provisions of 
§ 2255. 116 S. Ct. at 2339. He is in an unusual situation 
because Bailey was not yet decided at the time of his first 
§ 2255 motion. Our holding that in this circumstance 
§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective is therefore a narrow 
one. In the posture of the case before us, we need go no 
further to consider the other situations, if any, in which the 





The question before us is not whether Dorsainvil is 
actually innocent of violating § 924(c)(1), but rather, as in 
Davis, 417 U.S. at 347, whether his claim that he is being 
detained for conduct that has subsequently been rendered 
non-criminal by an intervening Supreme Court decision is 
cognizable in a district court. The government does not 
argue that Dorsainvil "used" a firearm within the meaning 
of § 924(c)(1), but instead argues that Dorsainvil was 
"carrying" a firearm within the meaning of§ 924(c)(1), and 
therefore cannot present himself as "actually innocent." 
There may be some force in the government's argument, 
which has convinced our concurring colleague. Judge 
Stapleton relies for precedent on this court's recent decision 
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in United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1997), where 
we held that the defendant, who had a firearm in an 
automobile in a position similar to that of Dorsainvil, was 
guilty under the "carries" language of § 924(c)(1) penalizing 
anyone who "during and in relation to any . . . drug 
trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm." However, in 
Eyer, unlike this case, the facts showed that the handgun 
"was conveyed with the cocaine to the purchaser's 
apartment," id. at 476, which patentlyfits the definition of 
carrying. Dorsainvil argues that "transportation" of a 
firearm is not the same as "carrying" it for purposes of this 
statute. Moreover, Dorsainvil may argue that the jury was 
not fully charged on the "carry" aspect to§ 924(c)(1), and 
we have found that "carry" appears to have been referred to 
only summarily in the district court's instructions. 
 
We offer no opinion on these issues. Unlike our 
concurring colleague, we believe they are best presented to 
a district court as that court can view the full record of the 
evidence presented, the arguments made at trial, and the 
charge. It is sufficient for our purposes in declining to reach 
the constitutional issue raised by Dorsainvil that we have 
concluded that resort to § 2241 is still available in an 
appropriate case, and that Dorsainvil's claim is not so 
devoid of merit that it should be foreclosed by us at this 
stage. The AEDPA has channeled § 2241 petitions to the 
district courts in the first instance. No district court has 
had the opportunity to consider whether, following Bailey, 
Dorsainvil's conduct falls within § 924(c)(1). We cannot 
conclude that Dorsainvil has failed to present at least a 







We adhere to our prior order denying Dorsainvil's motion 
for certification to file a second petition pursuant to § 2255. 
Our denial is without prejudice to Dorsainvil's right to file 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 in a district court in the district of his confinement. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
As I read the opinion of the court, my colleagues and I 
agree on the following propositions: 
 
1. Dorsainvil has failed to meet the gatekeeping criteria 
of the AEDPA applicable to successive petitions under 
§ 2255. 
 
2. Section 2255 is not "inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of detention" merely because access to a federal 
court under that section is barred by the gatekeeping 
provisions. The availability of relief by way of an initial 
petition means that § 2255 is normally adequate and 
effective for this purpose even though a successive petition 
would be barred by the gatekeeping provisions. 
 
3. Section 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of detention" in a case where the gatekeeping 
provisions bar a successive petitioner who can allege actual 
innocence of the crime of which he was convicted and who, 
at the time of his earlier petition(s), could not demonstrate 
that innocence. Accordingly, § 2255 is "inadequate or 
ineffective" in a situation in which a successive petitioner 
can allege both that the Supreme Court, since his last 
petition, has interpreted the statute under which he was 
convicted in a new way and that his conduct was lawful 
under the statute as subsequently interpreted. 
 
4. Although the gatekeeping provisions applicable to 
successive § 2255 petitions must "inform" a court in 
determining whether to entertain a petition under§ 2241, 
cf. Felker v. Turpin, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (so 
holding with respect to the gatekeeping provisions 
applicable to successive § 2254 petitions), a court can 
entertain a § 2241 petition where a successive petitioner 
can allege both that the Supreme Court, since his last 
petition, has interpreted the statute under which he was 
convicted in a new way and that his conduct was lawful 
under the statute as so interpreted. 
 
5. Denial of Dorsainvil's application for permission to 
file a successive § 2255 petition because he has failed to 
satisfy the gatekeeping provisions does not violate the Due 
Process Clause or the Suspension of the Writ Clause. 
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As I read the court's opinion, my colleagues and I do 
differ on whether it may be possible in this particular case 
for Dorsainvil to gain access to a federal court under 
§ 2241. They suggest that a district court, after viewing "the 
full record of the evidence presented, the arguments made 
at trial, and the charge" (Slip Op. at 14), might properly 
decide to entertain a § 2241 petition despite the fact that 
Dorsainvil has not satisfied the gatekeeping provisions of 
the AEDPA applicable to successive § 2255 petitions. I 
disagree because it is clear from the record in this case that 
Dorsainvil cannot allege facts which will support his claim 
of actual innocence, and therefore the unavailability of 
relief under § 2255 does not render that provision 
inadequate or ineffective as to him. 
 
Dorsainvil was indicted for "knowingly us[ing] and 
carry[ing] ... a firearm during and in relation to ... drug 
trafficking crimes." Superseding Indictment, Count III., 
App. at 36-37. In accordance with the indictment, the court 
charged the jury on "using or carrying afirearm during and 
in relation to a drug trafficking crime." Tr. at 9 (emphasis 
added).1 The undisputed facts from Dorsainvil's trial and 
the jury's finding that he used or carried a gun "during and 
in relation to a drug trafficking crime" make it impossible 
for him to allege that his conduct was not prohibited by the 
statute he was convicted of violating. 
 
The uncontradicted record establishes that Dorsainvil 
drove the truck, that he was apprehended in the driver's 
seat with cocaine in his pants, that there was a loaded gun 
with a live round in the chamber in an open paper bag also 
containing his wallet and personal papers, that the bag was 
located between the front seats within his reach, and that 
the firearm was purchased by and registered to him. 
Dorsainvil did not contest these facts at trial. Nor did he 
contest the fact that he had placed the gun in the truck. He 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At oral argument Dorsainvil's counsel questioned the adequacy of the 
charge on "carrying," pointing out that more emphasis was placed on 
"using." Dorsainvil did not object at trial to the charge on this ground. 
More importantly, he cannot succeed at this stage in the game merely by 
pointing to a deficiency in a jury instruction. He must allege facts that 
affirmatively demonstrate innocence. This he cannot do. 
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denied only that the gun's presence bore any relation to the 
drug transaction. Based on facts that Dorsainvil does not 
now dispute, and after being fully instructed on the "in 
relation to" element of the offense charged, the jury found 
Dorsainvil guilty as charged. 
 
While Dorsainvil stresses that the trial court gave a more 
expansive definition of "use" than would be warranted after 
Bailey, he ignores the fact that he "carried" the gun in 
relation to the drug transaction, even if he did not also 
"use" it in relation to that transaction. Indeed, on virtually 
the same facts, this court has held that the defendant 
"carried" a gun in relation to a drug offense. United States 
v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1997). Despite the court's 
suggestion to the contrary, there is no legally relevant 
distinction between Dorsainvil's case and Eyer. 
 
Police arrested the defendant in Eyer while he was 
making a delivery of cocaine and seized his automobile. 
They discovered "a fully loaded Colt .380 caliber semi- 
automatic hand gun with a live round in its chamber 
located in the console between its front seats along with 
some cocaine." Id. at 471. After defendant-Eyer's § 924(c)(1) 
conviction at a bench trial, he filed a § 2255 petition 
predicated on the decision in Bailey. He asserted that he 
was tried "based on the expansive definition of `use' set 
forth in United States v. Theodoropoulus, 866 F.2d 587 (3d 
Cir. 1989), which held that a firearm was `used' if it was 
available for possible use during the drug transaction." 
Eyer, 113 F.3d at 475. Eyer also insisted that the facts in 
his case could not justify a conviction under the carry 
prong. The district court rejected both arguments and we 
affirmed. With respect to Eyer's insistence that he did not 
"carry" the gun, we held: 
 
[T]he facts here compel the conclusion that Eyer was 
carrying the firearm.... [T]he handgun was loaded and 
was in a console between the two front seats, and was 
conveyed with the cocaine to the purchaser's 
apartment. Eyer's easy access to the handgun and its 
transportation convinces us that he was carrying it. 
 
Id. at 476 (emphasis added). Dorsainvil, too, had easy 
access to a gun while he transported it during and in 
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relation to a drug offense, and these facts compel the 
conclusion that Dorsainvil "carried" the gun. 
 
In short, this is not a case in which the petitioner alleges 
facts that demonstrate actual innocence, and no 
miscarriage of justice will result from denial of the § 2255 
certification. Accordingly, alternative access to a federal 
court under § 2241 is not necessary to the constitutionality 
of § 2255, and I would not suggest that such access might 
be available. 
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